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USING AGENCY THEORY AS AN
ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE FOR PENSION
ACCOUNTING
Gerald H . Lander
Alan Reinstein
Augu tin K. Fosu
Introduction
After studying the issues relating to accounting for employees' pension
plan for more than 11 years, in 1985 the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)
o. 87, Employers Accounting for Pensions (6), which super edes previous
standards of accounting for defined benefit pen ion plans (e.g., Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 8). Five years later, the FASB issued SFAS
o. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postreurement Benefits Other Than
Pensions (7). Both authoritative pronouncement followed similar method
of allocating and accruing pension and postrctirement cost within certain
guidelines, rather than to management' or the employer' nuctuating operating needs. Thus, a discussion of the theory of pension incorporates both
the theories of pension and postretircmcnt benefits. However, some of the
nc11 guideline, may ha1e become dogmatic as ertions about the economic
assumptions for such plans and specifically 10 ignore the fact that a central
economic consideration in an) plan must be the benefits to the employer.
The distinguishing leature of thh paper 1s that II uses an agency theory
model to evaluate the benefit, 10 the employer of having a pension plan and
the payment ol po tre11rement benef11s other than pension . II then e,amines
the specific requirements of SrAS o. 7 and SF.\S o. 106 to see if they
mea,ure these costs and benefit, in accordance 11 ith the principles of agency
theon
The author, address the general problem that standards for accounting
for pcm1on co,ts and for po,tretirement bendits should be continually revised bccaw,e they lad. a comprchemi1e theoreucal frameworl,. This problem
is especially 11nportant given the U.S. General Accounting Office estimate
of pm ate employers' unfunded obhgauom for future po tretircment health
care benefit, to exceed $400 billion ( 13) Pcn,1on obhgauom ha1e also increased ,1gn1g1cantly. Thus, the prov1s1om of these two standards should cause
companies to rccogni,e and control these large obhgat1om. In addition, a
valid frame11ork for determining the optimal amount of pen,1on costs and
ot her postretirement benefits t hat employers shou ld pro1ide their employees
should be de,eloped.
The purpose of the paper is to u e agency theory to help develop an analytical basis fo r pen ion plan accou nti ng to poi nt up the trengths and wea kne cs of S FA
o . 87 and 106. T he paper consi I of four parts: ( I) a general
discussio n of pe nsion theory; (2) t he assumed la bor contract underlying the
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decision model; (3) the decision model; and, (4) the use of this model to help
resolve some critical aspects o f the pension reporting issue.

Pension Theor) in General
Various theories have been offered Lo explain pension plans. Two of the
better known are the gratuity theory and the deferred wage theory (16) ( 17).
The gratuity theory as erts that employers provide pension payments Lo reward a lifetime ol service. Employees are not mrnlved explicitly in the decision Lo establish pension plans since uch payments are discretionary and
convey them fe", if any, property rights. This theory has found liLLle support in the literatu re and has generall:,, been replaced by the! deferred wage
theory. The deferred wage theory views the pension plan as a method LO defer
some compensation until an employee retires. Employers prombe to provide pension payments in exchange for current sen1ces. The deferment of
wages often results in individual tax savings. The advantages to the employer of providing a pension plan are less ob, ious. Under the deferred wage
theory, firms offer pension plans because of economies ol \Cale m administrative, portfolio management, and other costs (8, 9, and 14) The employer
receive cash no" benefits to the extent that the present value of deferred
wages exceeds the required funding (especially as now required b} ERISA).
However, employer benefits depend on the theorettcal <lescnption of the labor
market that 1s adopted. Pesando and Clarke ( 18) explain that in a spot labor
market, a firm is indifferent between paying current ,\ages and paying the
present value of future pension payments. Thus, the firm receives no direct
financial advantage from offering a pension plan.
A firm may offer a pension plan as part of a long-term labor incentive
contract. The deferred ,\age theory generall; incorporates a long term or
ltfeume implictt labor contract berneen the employer and employee that has
various 1mplica1iom for the employer. Salop and Sa lop (21) and Blinder (3)
suggest that the delayed vest mg of pem1on plam ma; decrease employee turnover costs. Becker (I) suggests that firms ha,e an 111cenuve to expend training costs because of delayed vesting since II causes "average" employees to
\\Ork longer tor the company, resulting ma greater payback of these trammg costs. The agency theory model developed in this paper helps find an
optimal amount of o,erall monetary and non monetary pro, ision\.
Logue (15) and Choudbur; (4) abo suggest that pem1on plans are not merely deferred wages but provide employee incenuves that may reduce the firm\
costs. The incentives, such as additional pem1on or profit-sharing contributions, will be effecttve only 1f cost savings are shared ,,ith the employees.
Joss1m, Dexter and Sidhu (1 1) show that properl y designed compensation
packages, including deferred compensauon components, help assure that
managers act in the stockholders' and creditors' interests.

Agenc) Thcor) and the Contracting Proce!>i.
The labor ma rket is assumed to be a system o f agency contracts. In general, the agency relationship is a contract in which the principal engages an
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agent to act in his/her behalf. The contract delegates some decision-making
authority to the agent. If both parties are utility maximizers, the agent may
not always act in the prmcipal's best interest; the principal may, therefore,
incur monitoring costs to lim11 the agent's self-serving behavior. A fee structure enables the principal to establish incentives to better monito r the agent.
The formal theory of principals and agents normally rests on the following
assumptions regarding the agents ( 12, pp. 779-783): I) They are rational and
wish to maximize their mvn utilities; 2) They seek both financial and nonfinancial rewards (a11ract1ve offices, special privileges); 3) They are generally risk averse if stakes a re sufficiently large; 4) As subordinates, their
individual interests will not alway be congruent with the interests of the principal; and, 5) The} prefer leisure to hard work.
The firm 1s assumed to have a single owner-manager (the principal) whose
obJec11ve is to ma\1m11e his her expected utiliues, whose utilities depend on
wealth and, therefore, 11s obJecm·e is 10 max1m1ze the present \ alue of the
firm's profits. Each employee (the agent) is assumed 10 be risk averse and
intent on ma,1m1zmg his her e,pected utility. I lowever, his her utiht} 1s a sumed 10 depend on effort as well as wealth. Effort is interpreted as a productive input wllh direct disutility for the agent. This disutility creates a difference
bet\\een the principal and agent's objecmes.
Agency theory assumes that some equilibrium will be reached. That 1s,
the employee and employer \viii agree upon some compensation to provide
the employee at least a minimum level of e,pected uulit} g1\en an expected
level of effort. The employer expects a marginal product whose value at least
equals the compensauon. Berkok (2) ,hows that thi op11mum payment function can be a contin uous or sem1contm uous rnriable.
A fixed wage contract 1s one of many possible labor contracts available
to labor market participants The wage guarantees the employee a minimum
level of u11I11y and is a11amed b) a labor market or bargaining process. The
labor market supplies the amount of uu lit y an employee cou ld receive by
going clse\vhere Con,equent l), equilibrium 1s attained.
In addition to the fP,ed \\age compensation, the employer ma> be \\illing
to prm 1de add111onal compensauon in the form of an incentive cont ract. An
mcenti\ e contract 1s designed to promote the employer's obJectives b> encouraging employee efforts or actions beneficial to the employer's desi red
outcome (profit), including quid.er \CSting of benefits, greater employee
benelns (overume), and a larger employee share of the cost Sa\ mg '\n incent ive contract could be a means to reduce costs b:r encouraging e1ther loyalt>
to the firm or cooperation in the firm's endeavors. "Loyalty," as applied
to corporations, is a disputed nouon these days, but the traditional\ 1e\v has
been that loyalty increases tenure and lengthened tenure lowers turno\er co ts:
hiring, firing and trai ning costs. Profits may further increa e from employee
expertise, and experience may be gained through longer tenure. Employees
may work harder and more efficiently if they possess a sense of loyalt y, and
a firm may be able to reduce its monitoring cost \\ ith loyal employees.
If "loyalty" is a suspect term, one may till argue that an incentive contract encourages an atmosphere of cooperation among all corporate parties
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becau e cooperation i mutually beneficial. As a result of quicker vesting,
greater benefit , and sharing in the cost-savings, employees would be motivated to provide a better quality of erv1ce for a longer period of time. Their
job environment would become more pleasant because they are paid currently and expect additional future compensation. Q\\ner-managers also
recognize the benefits of cooperating with the employees' increased profits.
Incentive contracts hould save employers additional compensation costs.
In es ence, the employer is sharing potential cost Sa\ ings \\Ith the employee.
By offering an incentive contract to reali,e cost savings, the employer will
pay the employee some of those expected cmt savings in the future. This
incentive plan can be a pension plan; additional compensation 1s offered to
the employee payable upon retirement {or if \ested, possibly \\hen leaving
the firm) in order to increase tenure and loyalty. The employer must decide
\\hether to offer the pension plan incentive in addition to the fixed wage
contract.
A new model is de\eloped in this paper by \1ewing a defined-benefit penion plan in an agenc} framework. Using agency theory to describe the underlying contracting process, the authors propose that a pension plan, b>
providing levels consistent with employee preferences, sen cs as an employee
incentive to produce employer cost sav111gs. Broader 111 scope than the deferred
\\age theory, this model 111corporates the employer's objecme of realizing
cost savings in addition to those sa\111gs associated \\Ith deferred \,ages. The
employer shares the avings with the employees 111 the form of a pension plan.
The proposed decision model suggests whether and hO\\ an employer will
adopt a pension plan. While 111corporating the use of employee 111ccntivcs,
it docs not rely upon the a sumpt1on of a lifetime implic.H contract.
The Decision Model
A fixed wage contract and an inccnti\C contract in cxdiange lor current
ser\iccs and expected cost sa\ings form part of the employer-employee contrac1111g process. A uulity-maximi,ing employer should share an} expected
cost sav111gs \Vllh the employee. If the 111cenll\c contract 1s not expected to
produce cost sa\ings, the contract \\Ill not be used; no pension plan will be
offered. In addition, \\hile actual cost sa\111gs ma> not equal expected cost
savings, expected cost sav111gs determine the use of the 111ccntive contract.
Thus, the employer must first esumatc the total costs of employment over
the employee's lifetime and then estimate the expected cost sav111gs \\hich
could arise through increased employee tenure and loyalty. If the employer
decides to offer a pension plan, he must then choose a sharing rate to de1erm111e Iuture employee pension payments. The above discussion leads to the
derived model.
The following notation is used:
U = the employer's utility function in wealth.
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KT

the expected total cost of employment over the employee's lifetime
(without an incentive contract), e.g., wages, monitoring costs, potential hiring and firing costs and training costs.

KA

the random total act ua l cost of employment (with an incentive contract) over the employee's lifetime, known ex post but not ex ante.
Ex post RA depends upon:

1.

The tenure and cost reduction a nd productivity efforts of the
employee, which are a function of the share of the cost-savings
resulting from the incentive contract.

2.

The effect of uncontrollable conti ngencies on actual costs. a
the employer's shari ng rate, where O a
1.

PT

that portion of the entity's expected profit independent of a.

W

the owner-m anager's initial wealth.

=

EU

the employer's expected utility function in wealth.

CE

certainty equivalent (i.e., the amount of wealth equivalent to EU).

1fan incentive contract is used, the total employee compen~ation would
include fixed wages plus a sharing payment of ( 1 - a) (KT - R,). The employer must first decide whether to offer a pension plan, i.e., if expected
cost savings are positive. 1f the expected present value of Kr exceeds the
present value of K,, then a pension may be offered to the employee. KT is
calculated initially when the decision is made to hire the employee and is
~n integral part of an investment decision. The expected present value of
R, 1s calcu lated by incorporating ne\\, estimates of turnover costs, employee
effort, and productivity that will result from having the incentive contract.
The owner-manager must next choose a sharing rate, a. We assume competitive markets, so he she has little or no control over acrnal per-unit employment costs. Thus, the O\\ ner-manager is essentiall) ch.9osing 10 share
in the uncertain outcome of a profit lottery, Z = Kr - R,. The chosen
sharing rate deterl!.li nes the range of the owner-manager's incentive profi t
outcome a(K1 - K,) and therefore structures the ri,J.. characteristics of a
contract profit lottery in accordance with his her risk preference . The employer's utili ty function represents his her risk preferences and determines
the selectio n of a. This opportunity to structure risk preferences provides
a nother reason fo r the incentive contract. Thus, the incentive contract choice
of a can reduce costs and strucwre the risJ.. characteristics o f employment
contracts. The decision problem is assumed to relate to a single employee
type alt hough as Fosu (8), for example, has sho,, n, employer decision regarding nonwage benefits tend 10 be based on the preferences of the marginal
employee repre enting each preference type. The employer's objective is then
to maximize'
(I)
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The owner-manager's certain\.)' equivalent can be defined as
CE{\\ + PT+ o(K, - K,)} = U 1[EU{\\ + Pr + o(K 1 K,d)G)
By rewriting CE[W, Pr + o(K 1 - Kall as CE(\\, f(o, 7)], ,vhere f(o, Z)
repre\ents the uncertain payoff P 1 + o7 and Z - (k. 1 - K ,), ,ve denve the
certainty equi\'aleQt a\
CE(\\, f(o, Z)) = U 1 [EU(\\ + P 1 + a/)) - \\)
(3)
An equi\'alence can be established Qet\\een the uncertam payoff P 1 + oZ. and
the certainty equivalent CE[\\. f(o, Z)) \\c can detine the mvner-manager's risk
premium as
Ff\\ , f(o, 7)) = E(P 1 + o7) - CE[\\, f(o. 7))
= PT + oE(Z) - CE(\\. f(o, 7)1
(4)
Rearrangmg and ~olv mg for CE[~~ l(a, /)) yield,
CE(\\ . f(o, 7)1 = Pr + a[(7l - fl\\. l(o, Zll
(5)
The owner-manager\ problem can then be written a,
\lax[P 1 + oE(Zl - fl\\. f(o, /))
(6)
0 < a <I
\\nh U(\\ + P 1 + aZ) as the o,,n1:r-mana~r·, uulit) funcuon and g(Z) as
the probabilit) densit 1 funcuon of 7 = K I
K,. the m, ner manager'\ op1imi.u11ion problem becomes
\la>. CU(.) = \ta,{fl,(\\ + P 1 + a/Jg(/)dl}
(7)
0

0

Here EU(.) represen!'I the expected utility a, a funcuon of u,mg an exponenual
funcuon L(\.) = I - e '" to represent the m, ner-manager\ utilit 1 funcuon
(,,here'< i, the functional argument (,,ealth). and r reprc,ent, the con,tant ri,k
a,er,ion le,el), ,,e ha,e
\lax [U(a)
\la,{ f(l - c-r1\\ + Pr • a 1)g(z)dtl
a
o

= \la,{ I - e ~" ..
0

P 1 11"-

.tg(Z)D1}

(8)

f·ocusmg on the component e ralg(Z)D1, and as,ummg that g(/) l,lll be appro,imate<l b) a normal di,tribuuon ,,1th mean m and variance ol, ,,c ha,e
be-• 1 g(Z)Dt =
I
6e r,te
(l-m)2 D1
OV2TT
ol
_I_ 6c -1
ol/"2.rr
"2.02
"2.rool/

+

{

+

2roo-7

(Z

111) }dl

(I - mF = (7
(m - roo2)F + 2mroo2 - r2a2o-'
= [Z - (m - roo2)F + 2ro2(m. - 1 ro2a2)

Therelorc, the abme cxpre"ion can be \Hillen a,

(9)

(10)

I

QC rolg(Z)<l/ =

C

(1 ,.

o2(1

2u O)

o2n
2
D,ffercnuaung cquauon (11) vvnh respect to a and settmg the expression equal
to Lero, we obtam the first-order condition
cxp[-r(mo - ro2<,2/2)1 (m - ro2) = O
(12)
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It follows then that the employer's optimal sharing rate is
0 if m
0
a* = {
min {I, m/ro2) if m > 0
Combining equations (3) and (11) and noting that the right-hand side of equation (11) equals EU (aZ), the owner-manager's certainty equivalent, given by
CE (a) = Pr + ma - ½ra2o2
(13)
may be expressed at the optimum as
CE(a*) = Pr + m2/2ro2 if O m
ro2 or
CE(a*) = Pr + m - ro2/2 if m > ro2
The owner-manager's certainty equivalent is, therefore, a function of the implicit risk-aversion level r characteristic of a given employee group. The optimum
a*, for large 02 relative to m, lies between O and I, making a fixed wage contract combined with an incentive pension plan the optimal contract for a riskaverse individual. By setting r = 0 in the expression for a*, for an expected profit
maximizing or risk-neutral individual, a* = 0 or I, depending on whether m
0 or m > 0. A risk-neutral employer would be indifferent between assuming
all risk (a= I), (i.e., sharing none of the potential cost savings with the employee)
and assuming no risk (a=O) (i.e., giving the employee all potential cost savings).
Since the above optimization is employee-type specific, by partitioning the employees into separate units or subgroups of closely related workers, each with
its own sharing rate, a higher certainty equivalent or risk-adjusted value for the
total labor co t package can be attained than for one master pension plan contract. This partitioning strategy would relate to the assignment of different sharing rates and thereby different pension payments to different employee subgroups.
These subgroups may be determined, for example, by years of service with the
firm. Thus, a set of pension payments (optimal sharing rate ) corresponding to
a set of employee groups will reduce the overall risk of uncertainty of fixed wage
contracts. This risk reduction implies a risk. reduction effect similar to that developed in portfolio theory. Overall then, a pension plan provides benefits to the
owner-manager of the firm in three ways:
I. Provides an incentive to employee to reduce such employment co ts as
training and turnover expenses, since amounts provided would presumably be consistent with the employees' preferences.
2. Helps reconcile the risk characteristics of an employment contract with the
employer's implicit risk aver ion formulated on the basis of employee
characteristics.
3. Reduces risk by providing differem pension plan provisions for different
employee groups.
To summarize, owner-managers seek 10 maximize wealth by reducing the lifetime expected costs of employment, Kr, which they have e timated and u ed in
making their decision to hire employees. The owner-manager estimates the expected actual costs of employment, KA, over the employee's lifetime that re ult
after the incorporation of a pension plan in the labor contract. In order for a
pension plan to be offered, th~ owner-manager should expect cost savings, i.e.,
the expected present value of Ki\ should be less than the expected present value
of Kr.
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Based upon the two estimates KT and K,, the owner-manager computes a
sharing rate, o which determines the amount of the expected cost savings over
the employee's lifetime that the employer will g1\e to the employee in pension
payments. The pension payment is the cost of the pension plan. Based upon the
two estimates, the employer agrees to provide an mcent1\e contract, a pension
plan, and agrees as part of that contract to make a pension payment upon retirement. The amount of the pension payment is calculated as (1-o) E(Kr - KA)
= pension payment upon retirement = the expected cost of the pension plan.
The pension payment can then be mcorporated into an actuarial benefit formula to determme the pension plan pro\1,1on,. The employer mu,1 then choose
ho\, 10 fund the pension pro,1s1om smce vanou, combinations can determine
a given pension payment. For example, the employer ma> e.\press the pension
payment in terms of a defined benefit that could be expressed as a function of
years of employee erv1ce, as a percentage of an employee's salar}, or both. If
the defined benefit is expressed as a function of years of sen ice, the employer
must estimate the number of years of employment prior to the employee\ retirement. Then the employer divides the pension payment b~ the number of years;
the r~ultmg annual dollar amoWlt of scn1ce determines the defined benefit. The
terms of the pension plan can be commu111ca1cd 10 the employee a, a set number
of dollar for each year of sen1ce. Both the defined benefit formula and the
pension payment are based on estimates, both subj(:(t 10 re, is1on due 10 changes
in estimate or 111 the basic plan itself. HO\\ever, the employer must communicate
the present known actuarial benefit formula
Ignoring market competition. the employee \,ill accept a pen,ion plan because
It 1s an 111cent1ve paid in addition to the market determmed \\age. The employee
does not necessarily sacrifice current wage, 10 be included 111 the pension plan.
The employee thus receives a tax-supported "forced ,aving,"ret1rcme111 program.
The employee "chooses" the le,el of effort that he \\Ill C\pend 10 produce the
c,pect cost sa,mgs for the employer. The eflcct1venes, of the pcni,on plan a,
an 111ccnt1vc
help determmc that Jc.cl of effort.

'"II

Application Under SFAS -...os. 87 and I06
The abo,e d1scuss1on has se,eral 1mplicat1on, for pension plan accounting.
hrst 1s the question of expense recognition. srAS os. 87 and 106 require the
recog111t1on of ,er\1ce com based upon the actuarial present ,alue of benefits
that employees earned during their current year of employment, which 1s 111 deference to a pay-as-you-go or tcrm111al fundmg system. S1m1larly, postre11reme111
benefits, under the provisions of SFAS o. 106, also arc \ICwed as deferred compensation arrangements whereb7 an employer agrees 10 pr0\1de these future
benefits in exchange for the employee's current services.
The agency theory model proposes that the employen, seek cost savings and
share them with their employees in an 111centive contract, a pen ion plan. If cost
savings motivate a pension plan, then cost savings should drive the accounting
for the pension plan. Thus, SFAS Nos. 87 and 106 are consistent with the matching principle of accounting, since labor costs are charged 10 the period in which
the services are performed. The costs are related to the promised pension pay-
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ments and labor services are the cost savings services that the employees produce.
The shared cost savings determine the pension payment which must be recognized as a pension expense and liability. Thus, the realization of cost savings relates to the realizauon of decreased accounting expenses and related liabiliues.
This implication contradicts the requirement of SFAS o. 87 (6, Para. 29-34)
and SFAS o. 106 (7, Para. 59-61) that unrecogni1ed net gains (and losm) be
deferred, i.e., amortized subject to a 10 percent "corridor" formula.
O ne of the most contenuous issues mvolving pension plan accountmg is how
to recognize prior service cost liabilities which result from benefits granted 111 a
plan amendment. l ncrea\ed pension payments are promised and determined on
the basis of years of service already provided by the employees. Some accountants feel that these pen ion plan revi ions should be recogmzed as present hab1lities. Others feel that these liabiliucs should be deferred due 10 the expected sa\1ngs
from future cost shanngs. The agency theory model Jusufies the SFAS ·os. 87
and 106 requirements that liabiliues be deferred due 10 the expected savmgs from
future cost sa\ ings.
According to SFAS No. 87 (6, Para. 24-27) and SFAS o. 106 (7, Para.
112-113), the accumulated pension or postretirement benefit obligation are components of the net pension liability (or asset). This obligation is the actuarial pre<.ent
value of benefib auributed to employee ,ef"\JCL"> to date. Prior sef"\ice co,ts should
n0\\ be amortl/ed over exl\tmg employees· SCl"\ice li\CS rather than at rates ranging
from no amomzauon 10 a maximum ot 10 percent per year, as ,,as required
under AFB No. 8. Thus, SFAS os. 87 and 106 bener match these e,pen,es
over the periods "here the em plover 1s e,pected to rece,, e mcreased producu, it}
from the employees recel\ mg these increased benefits.
According 10 the deri,ed model. once the pension plan is adopted, sen ices
to date are the labor sef"\1ce that the employee prm1ded. SrAS os. 87 and 106
abo require that the pen\lon liability should reflect pension plan amendment
for example, increased benefit, relati,e 10 prior vears of ,erv,ce. Howe,er,
1f the employer's obJective is to maxim11e utility, then the increast'<.1 benefits \\Ould
result from a re, ision of the estimated future cost ,a\ings, (K 1 - K,), or a re\lS1on of the cost savmgs shanng rate, a-, if the employee characteristic compo ,_
lions \\ere 10 change. In e11her case, the promise of increa,ed benefits would be
m e.xpectation of future cost savmgs. Thus, the current recognition of an increased
benefit obligauon, \\ h1ch " determmed 111 e\pt.'Ctauon of future co t ,a,ings, is
mconsistent w11h the recognition of the pension benefit obligation attnbuted to
the employee for the cost sa,mgs erv,ces to date
To be consistent, the benefit obhgauon resulting lrom plan amendments and
expressed as a function of prior years of semce should be recognized as a deferred
liability and then amortized as future cost avings services are provided. Thi analysis ,,ould also apply to the recogniuon of the pen ,on e,pense. Thus, recogmtion would occur as cost savings are realized. This treatment 1s consistent with
the accounting treatment for the other provisions of the labor contract, wages
for labor services. An accounting expen e and liability are recognized in the same
period as the employee provides labor ervices.
A problem arises in measuring the co t savings resulting from the pen ion plan
incentive. That is, how can the employers measure cost saving pattern due to
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the desired effort? Without a measurement of the savings pattern, it is difficult
to determine an expense and liability recognition pattern for the expected pension payments. Arbitrary measurement patterns such as the accepted actuarial
methods used today can possibly solve this problem; hm,e,er, the model presented
here suggests that such cost allocation methods should be based on employee
risk characteristics.
umma11 and Conclusion
An analytical basis for pension plan accounting 1s developed in this paper by
working out a rationale and framework for the employer\ dec1s1on 10 provide
deferred benefits. The agency model developed demonstrates that the ownermanager seeks 10 maximize \\calth by reducing the hfellme expected costs of employment which he/ she has estimated and used m his her decision to hire employees. The O\\ner-manager estimates the expected actual costs of employment
over the employee's lifetime that will result after the incorporation of a pension
plan in the labor contract. In order for a pen ion plan to be offered, the ownermanager should expect a cost savmgs. A sharing rate 1s then calculated based
upon the expected cost sa,mgs over the employee's lifetime. The agenc} theory
model is utilized to calculate the opumum pension pa:rinent by the owner-manager.
Some of the major implica!lons of the agenC) theory model developed here on
current prac!lce are
(I) The shared cost sa,ings determine the pension payment, which under current practice must be recognized as a pension expense and liability. The
shared cost savings to the management-owner \hould decrease accountmg
expenses. However, the pro,isions of SFAS o. 87 and SFAS o. 106
require that unrecognized net gaim and losses be deterred and be amortized subJect 10 the 10 percent corridor formula.
(2) The agency theory model developed here justifies the SFAS Nos. 87 and
106 reqmrements that liabiliti~ be deferred due to the expected sa,mg from
future cost savings.
(3) Amendments 10 the plan would also reduce pension expense by the
management-owner share of the cost savings. Thus, the current recognition of an increased benefit obligauon, ,,h1ch is determmed m expecta!lon
of future cost savings, 1s inconsistent with the recognnion of the pension
benefit obliga!lon attributed to the employee for the coM savings services
to date.
Both the FASB and actuaries should consider the 1mphcallons of the agency
theory model developed in this paper. They should look at the decision making
process utilized by management-owners (as illustrated here) in deciding to offer
a pension plan and in making amendments to the plan. Pension expen e and
the respective liability need to be considered as the accounting for pension plans
evolves, especially at this time, when the cost of pension plans is skyrocketing
and rising medical costs suggest a fragile future for traditionally oriented pension plans.
The derived model shows that pension plans generally atisfy the utilities of
both employers and employees, especially if they can agree on an optimal sharing rate.
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Footnotes

'Pesando and Rea (19), Treynor, Regan and Priest (23), Skinner (22) and Cymrot (5) present arguments that pensions should be regarded as deferred wages.
'Fosu (8), however, developed a "competitive provision hypothesis" showing
that the employer (or union) has the incentive to provide pension plans in order
to satisfy employee preferences.
' For details of the characteristics of equilibrium involving incentive-signalling
models, see, for example, Fosu (8), Ross (20), Walklins and Long (24) and Zimmerman (25).
'Gandhi (10) used a similar model to determine the optimal sharing rate for
government incentive contracts.
'This mapping satisfies conditions of a utility function, for U, > 0, U" < 0,
U(0) = 0 and (U" U,) = r > 0. ote that the value of r depends upon the
risk characteristics of the given employee group.
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